Reading Help Beyond good and evil

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` BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL `
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` BY FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE `
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` TABLE OF CONTENTS `
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` PREFACE `
` BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL `
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` CHAPTER I: PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS `
` CHAPTER II: THE FREE SPIRIT `
` CHAPTER III: THE RELIGIOUS MOOD `
` CHAPTER IV: APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES `
` CHAPTER V: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS `
` CHAPTER VI: WE SCHOLARS `
` CHAPTER VII: OUR VIRTUES `
` CHAPTER VIII: PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES `
` CHAPTER IX: WHAT IS NOBLE? `
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` FROM THE HEIGHTS (POEM TRANSLATED BY L.A. MAGNUS) `
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` PREFACE `
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` SUPPOSING that Truth is a woman--what then? Is there not ground `
` for suspecting that all philosophers, in so far as they have been `
` dogmatists, have failed to understand women--that the terrible `
` seriousness and clumsy importunity with which they have usually `
` paid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled and unseemly `
` methods for winning a woman? Certainly she has never allowed `
` herself to be won; and at present every kind of dogma stands with `
` sad and discouraged mien--IF, indeed, it stands at all! For there `
` are scoffers who maintain that it has fallen, that all dogma lies `
` on the ground--nay more, that it is at its last gasp. But to `
` speak seriously, there are good grounds for hoping that all `
` dogmatizing in philosophy, whatever solemn, whatever conclusive `
` and decided airs it has assumed, may have been only a noble `
` puerilism and tyronism; and probably the time is at hand when it `
` will be once and again understood WHAT has actually sufficed for `
` the basis of such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices as `
` the dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popular `
` superstition of immemorial time (such as the soul-superstition, `
` which, in the form of subject- and ego-superstition, has not yet `
` ceased doing mischief): perhaps some play upon words, a deception `
` on the part of grammar, or an audacious generalization of very `
` restricted, very personal, very human--all-too-human facts. The `
` philosophy of the dogmatists, it is to be hoped, was only a `
` promise for thousands of years afterwards, as was astrology in `
` still earlier times, in the service of which probably more `
` labour, gold, acuteness, and patience have been spent than on any `
` actual science hitherto: we owe to it, and to its "super- `
` terrestrial" pretensions in Asia and Egypt, the grand style of `
` architecture. It seems that in order to inscribe themselves upon `
` the heart of humanity with everlasting claims, all great things `
` have first to wander about the earth as enormous and awe- `
` inspiring caricatures: dogmatic philosophy has been a caricature `
` of this kind--for instance, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia, and `
` Platonism in Europe. Let us not be ungrateful to it, although it `
` must certainly be confessed that the worst, the most tiresome, `
` and the most dangerous of errors hitherto has been a dogmatist `
` error--namely, Plato's invention of Pure Spirit and the Good in `
` Itself. But now when it has been surmounted, when Europe, rid of `
` this nightmare, can again draw breath freely and at least enjoy a `
` healthier--sleep, we, WHOSE DUTY IS WAKEFULNESS ITSELF, are the `
` heirs of all the strength which the struggle against this error `
` has fostered. It amounted to the very inversion of truth, and the `
` denial of the PERSPECTIVE--the fundamental condition--of life, to `
` speak of Spirit and the Good as Plato spoke of them; indeed one `
` might ask, as a physician: "How did such a malady attack that `
` finest product of antiquity, Plato? Had the wicked Socrates `
` really corrupted him? Was Socrates after all a corrupter of `
` youths, and deserved his hemlock?" But the struggle against `
` Plato, or--to speak plainer, and for the "people"--the struggle `
` against the ecclesiastical oppression of millenniums of `
` Christianity (FOR CHRISITIANITY IS PLATONISM FOR THE "PEOPLE"), `
` produced in Europe a magnificent tension of soul, such as had not `
` existed anywhere previously; with such a tensely strained bow one `
` can now aim at the furthest goals. As a matter of fact, the `
` European feels this tension as a state of distress, and twice `
` attempts have been made in grand style to unbend the bow: once by `
` means of Jesuitism, and the second time by means of democratic `
` enlightenment--which, with the aid of liberty of the press and `
` newspaper-reading, might, in fact, bring it about that the spirit `
` would not so easily find itself in "distress"! (The Germans `
` invented gunpowder-all credit to them! but they again made things `
` square--they invented printing.) But we, who are neither Jesuits, `
` nor democrats, nor even sufficiently Germans, we GOOD EUROPEANS, `
` and free, VERY free spirits--we have it still, all the distress `
` of spirit and all the tension of its bow! And perhaps also the `
` arrow, the duty, and, who knows? THE GOAL TO AIM AT. . . . `
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` Sils Maria Upper Engadine, JUNE, 1885. `
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` CHAPTER I `
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` PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS `
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` 1. The Will to Truth, which is to tempt us to many a hazardous `
` enterprise, the famous Truthfulness of which all philosophers `
` have hitherto spoken with respect, what questions has this Will `
` to Truth not laid before us! What strange, perplexing, `
` questionable questions! It is already a long story; yet it seems `
` as if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at last `
` grow distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away? That `
` this Sphinx teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves? WHO is `
` it really that puts questions to us here? WHAT really is this `
` "Will to Truth" in us? In fact we made a long halt at the `
` question as to the origin of this Will--until at last we came to `
` an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We `
` inquired about the VALUE of this Will. Granted that we want the `
` truth: WHY NOT RATHER untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? `
` The problem of the value of truth presented itself before us--or `
` was it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us `
` is the Oedipus here? Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a `
` rendezvous of questions and notes of interrogation. And could it `
` be believed that it at last seems to us as if the problem had `
` never been propounded before, as if we were the first to discern `
` it, get a sight of it, and RISK RAISING it? For there is risk in `
` raising it, perhaps there is no greater risk. `
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` 2. "HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For `
` example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will `
` to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the `
` pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such `
` genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse `
` than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different `
` origin, an origin of THEIR own--in this transitory, seductive, `
` illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, `
` they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in `
` the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the 'Thing-in-itself-- `
` THERE must be their source, and nowhere else!"--This mode of `
` reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians `
` of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the `
` back of all their logical procedure; through this "belief" of `
` theirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," for `
` something that is in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." The `
` fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES `
` OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt `
` here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most `
` necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, "DE OMNIBUS `
` DUBITANDUM." For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses `
` exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and `
` antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their `
` seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely `
` provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some `
` corner, perhaps from below--"frog perspectives," as it were, to `
` borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the `
` value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the `
` unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more `
` fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to `
` pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. `
` It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value of `
` those good and respected things, consists precisely in their `
` being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil `
` and apparently opposed things--perhaps even in being essentially `
` identical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself `
` with such dangerous "Perhapses"! For that investigation one must `
` await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will `
` have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto `
` prevalent--philosophers of the dangerous "Perhaps" in every sense `
` of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new `
` philosophers beginning to appear. `
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` 3. Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read `
` between their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the `
` greater part of conscious thinking must be counted among the `
` instinctive functions, and it is so even in the case of `
` philosophical thinking; one has here to learn anew, as one `
` learned anew about heredity and "innateness." As little as the `
` act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and `
` procedure of heredity, just as little is "being-conscious" `
` OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater `
` part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly `
` influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. `
` And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, `
` there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological `
` demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life For `
` example, that the certain is worth more than the uncertain, that `
` illusion is less valuable than "truth" such valuations, in spite `
` of their regulative importance for US, might notwithstanding be `
` only superficial valuations, special kinds of maiserie, such as `
` may be necessary for the maintenance of beings such as ourselves. `
` Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the "measure of `
` things." `
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` 4. The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: `
` it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. `
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